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Environmental Concern and Rational Production, Consumption and Rehabilitation 
 
Amnon Levy, University of Wollongong, NSW, Australia 
 
Utility from consumption might be spoiled by the degradation of the environment. The 
incorporation of a direct dependency of utility on the state of the environment through 
environmental concern and the incorporation of the effects of production pollution and 
rehabilitative investment on the environment into a lifetime utility maximization model 
imply that a minimal degree of impatience is necessary for an interior steady state to 
exist. This steady state is unique, approachable along a path with damped oscillations of 
consumption and rehabilitative investment, and characterized by a larger production than 
in the steady state without environmental concern.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
Is the satisfaction of electricity consumers in China and India lessened by the adverse 
effect of their carbon-dioxide emitting power plants on the environment? Is the pleasure 
of Australians from the consumption facilitated by exporting coal to China and India 
diminished by this export’s contribution to global warming? More generally, is the 
satisfaction from consumption adversely affected by the environmental damage caused 
by human activity? What are the implications of such an adverse effect for the optimal 
consumption, investment in rehabilitating the environment, capital stock and output?  
   The major environmental concern surveys - the Health of the Planet Survey (HOP), the 
World Values Survey (WVS) and the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) – agree 
that environmental concern has globally risen, but disagree on the association of 
environmental concern with affluence. Analyzing the responses in twenty-four countries 
to the HOP survey, Riley Dunlap, George Gallup and Alec Gallup (1993) have found that 
nine out of the fourteen items that measure environmental concern are negatively 
correlated with GNP per capita. This finding suggests that environmental concern is 
universal rather than confined to rich countries. Using the WVS, Ronald Inglehart (1995, 
1997) has found strong support for environmental protection in rich countries and also in 
poor countries facing severe environmental problems. Consequently, he has argued that 
the rise in environmental concern in poor countries is due to severe problems of air and 
water pollution, whereas in rich country it is due to a post-materialism increased attention 
to non-economic values. Riley Dunlap and Angela Mertig (1997) have claimed that the 
negative correlation found in the HOP survey between environmental concern and GNP 
per capita implies that affluence is not a prerequisite for support for environmental 
protection. In contrast, the analyses of the responses to the ISSP surveys have not 
rejected the hypothesis of a positive relationship between environmental concern and 
affluence. In particular, Andreas Diekmann and Axel Franzen (1999) have found a high 
correlation between an index of priority for the environment and GNP per capita in the 
ISSP 1993 survey. Using both the ISSP 1993 and the ISSP 2003 surveys, Axel Franzen 
(2003) has also found that residents in wealthier nations express greater concern for the 
global condition of the environment, but the increase in real GDP per capita between 
1993 and 2000 did not lead to a further increase in environmental concern. 
   In view of these empirical findings, the assumption underlying the theoretical analysis 
presented in this paper is that the representative agent of every society values the 
environment and has non negligible degree of concern about the adverse effect of his 
production pollution on the environment. Furthermore, based on the responses to the 
ISSP surveys, which include questions on willingness to pay and priority for environment 
versus the economy, the proposed analysis employs the assumption that the 
representative agent’s concern about the environment directly affects his instantaneous 
utility from consumption. Namely, the representative agent’s satisfaction from current 
consumption is spoiled by the degradation of the environment engendered by his 
production. Having some degree of environmental concern also implies that the 
representative agent is not myopic. Consequently, the theoretical analysis assumes that 
the representative agent’s environmental concern also indirectly affects his instantaneous 
utility from consumption by diverting resources from current consumption to investment 
in rehabilitating the environment.  
   With these assumptions, the paper analyzes the effect of environmental concern on the 
interrelationship between consumption and investment in the environment for a rational 
representative agent within the conceptual framework of lifetime utility maximization. 
The analysis reveals that a minimal degree of impatience is necessary for an interior 
steady state to exist. In which case, the interior steady state is unique, asymptotically 
stable and approachable along a path displaying damped oscillations of consumption and 
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investment in the environment. The analysis also reveals that the optimal stationary 
output of an environmentally concerned representative agent is larger than that of an 
environmentally unconcerned representative agent. The analysis leading to these 
conclusions is structured as follows.  
   Section 2 adds concern for the environment to the representative agent’s instantaneous 
utility from consumption. The environmental concern augmented instantaneous utility 
function is used in Section 3 for expanding the prototype representative agent’s lifetime-
utility-maximization model attributed to Frank Ramsey (1928). As the value of the 
environment for an environmentally concerned agent is not negligible, the expansion also 
includes an environmental state equation, which describes the instantaneous 
improvement in the representative agent’s environment as the difference between his 
instantaneous environmental investment and his instantaneous production pollution. The 
allocation of resources to investment in the environment is taken into account by the 
capital state equation. The existence and uniqueness of the steady state, the possibility of 
convergence to steady state, and the stationary output level are investigated in section 4. 
 
2. Environmental concern and instantaneous utility 
The assumption that the instantaneous utility of an environmentally concerned agent from 
consumption is spoiled by a degradation of the environment is formally represented as 
follows. Let  indicate the quality of the environment and tE ∈ tc +∈  the agent’s level 
of consumption at time t, then ( , ) ( , )t t tc E c E ct−Δ ∀  for an environmentally concerned 
agent as long as . An analytically convenient modification of the standard 
instantaneous utility function  for representing the agent’s environmental concern 
is:  
0Δ >
( )tu c
( )t t tu E u c
β= , 0 1β≤ ≤ .        (1) 
   The agent’s degree of concern about the state of the environment is reflected by β . The 
affluence hypothesis suggests that β  increases with the agent’s income. However, in 
view of the disagreement between the analyses of the HOP, WVS and ISSP surveys on 
the association between environmental concern and GNP per capita, β  is henceforth 
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assumed to be independent of the agent’s income. For an environmentally unconcerned 
agent 0β =  (i.e., ), whereas for a fully concerned agent 
0
lim / /u c du dc
β→
∂ ∂ = 1β = . It is 
unlikely that all the members of the society are environmentally unconcerned. Nor it is 
likely that they are all fully concerned. Hence, the representative agent is taken to be 
partially concerned. Namely, he is assumed to have 0 1β< < .  
   Partial concern can lead to diversion of some resources from current consumption and 
capital investment to investment in rehabilitating the environment. Having a continuous 
and twice differentiable instantaneous utility function with (0) 0u = ,  and 0u′ > 0u′′ < , 
the representative agent is willing to forego a maximal fraction 
11 ((( ) / ) ( )) /t t tu E E u c tc
βε −= − −Δ  of his current consumption for maintaining his 
current environment  than living in a degraded one tE tE −Δ .
1 For instance, with 
 and γtt cu = 10 << γ , 
/1 (( ) / )tE E
β γε = − −Δ . This fraction increases with the 
potential degradation of the environment and with ratio of the representative agent’s 
degree of environmental concern to his elasticity of utility with respect to consumption. 
 
3. Rational choice 
The representative agent is assumed to be rational and, being environmentally concerned, 
non-myopic. As in the prototype lifetime utility maximizing model, he is infinitely lived, 
has a time consistent preferences reflecting a degree of impatience ( 0>ρ ), and has a 
lifetime utility U, which is measured by an additively separable function. In the present 
analysis, . In addition to production, consumption and 
investment in capital stock, the representative agent can invest in the environment (e.g., 
planting trees, recycling, and collecting and safely burying some of his carbon dioxide 
emissions). He chooses the joint trajectory of consumption and investment in his 
dttcutEeU t ))(()(
0
βρ∫=
∞
−
                                                          
1((1 ) ) ( ) ( )} {(1 ) (( ) / ) ( ))}E u c E u c c u E E u c1 { β β βε ε −− = −Δ ⇒ − = −Δ . 
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environment that maximize  subject to the motion equations of his 
capital stock and state of the environment.  
0
( ) ( ( ))te E t u c t dtρ β
∞
−∫
   For environmentally concerned agents, the shadow value of the environment is 
positive. The representative agent’s environment is degraded by the pollution (damage, 
more generally) generated by his production process. The representative agent’s 
environment is improved in a rate, g, which is concavely increasing in his investment ( ) 
in rehabilitation. That is, 
s
))(()())(()( tkwftEtsgtE −=          (2) 
where  indicates (with  and f 0f ′ > 0f ′′ < ) the representative agent’s instantaneous 
production and  is, for simplicity, a fixed production-polluting rate. The rate of 
environmental improvement is assumed to be diminishingly rising in s:  
and, in the absence of better ideas, 
w
0, 0g g′ ′′> <
0g ′′′ = .  
   The representative agent’s investment in environmental rehabilitation modifies the 
prototype motion equation of capital as follows: 
)()()()())(()( tkntstctkftk +−−−= δ       (3) 
where, as in the prototype model, δ  is the capital depreciation rate, and n  is the 
representative agent’s regeneration rate. 
   The present value Hamiltonian associated with the partially environmentally concerned 
representative agent’s optimal control problem (with the time index omitted for 
convenience) is:  
)]()([])()([)( 21 kwfEsgknsckfcuEeH
t −++−−−+= − λδλβρ    (4) 
where 01 >λ  and 02 >λ  are the shadow prices of the partially environmentally 
concerned representative agent’s stock of capital and quality of the environment, 
respectively. The Hamiltonian is concave in the control variables c and s and (recalling 
that 0 1β< < ) in the state variable E. Since w21 λλ −> , the Hamiltonian is also concave 
in k. Consequently, the Mangasarian’s theorem on the sufficiency of the Pontryagin’s 
maximum principle conditions is valid. These conditions include the adjoint equations: 
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1211 )()(')( λδλλ∂
∂λ nkfw
k
H
+++−=−=        (5) 
)()( 2
1
2 sgcuEeE
H t λβ
∂
∂λ βρ −−=−= −−       (6) 
the optimality conditions: 
0)(' 1 =−=
− λ
∂
∂ βρ cuEe
c
H t         (6) 
1 2 2 1{ ( ) 0} { /(
H g s E g s E
s
( ) )}∂ λ λ λ λ
∂
′= − + = ⇒ = ′      (7) 
and the transversality condition: 
lim ( ) 0
t
H t
→∞
= .          (8) 
   The differentiation of the optimality conditions with respect to time and, subsequently, 
the substitution of the adjoint equations for 1λ  and 2λ , of the optimality conditions for 
1λ  and 2λ , and of the right-hand side of the state-equation (2) for  lead to the 
following motion equations of the partially environmentally concerned representative 
agent’s consumption and rehabilitative investment: 
E
 
[1 /( ( ) )] '( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( ) / ]
( ) / ( )
w g s E f k n g s wf k Ec
u c u c
ρ δ β′+ − + + + −
=
′′ ′−
   (9) 
 
[1 /( ( ) )] '( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) / '( ) ( ) /
( ) ( )
w g s E f k n g s u c u c wf k Es
g s g s
δ β′ ′+ − + − −
=
′′ ′−
.   (10)  
(See the Appendix for a detailed derivation.) 
 
4. Steady state: existence, uniqueness, convergence and output 
Equations (9) and (10) are the golden rules for a society of partially environmentally 
concerned lifetime-utility maximizing agents. In addition to the discrepancy between the 
marginal product of capital and the user cost of capital, the advocated instantaneous 
changes in consumption and rehabilitative investment are affected by the full price of the 
society’s product [1  (a numéraire representing the output’s market price 
plus the ratio of the environmental damage rate to the rehabilitation rate), the society’s 
/( ( ) )]w g s E′+
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degree of concern about the environment ( β ), and the rate of change of its environment 
. The investigation of this set of golden rules leads to the following 
propositions about the existence and uniqueness of the steady state of consumption and 
investment in the environment, about the possibility of convergence to this steady state, 
and about the steady-state output level. 
[ ( ) ( ) / ]g s wf k E−
  
   PROPOSITION 1 (Existence and uniqueness): If, and only if, 
(1 ) ( ) / ( )ss sswf k E g sρ β> − + β , there exists a unique, interior steady-state combination 
of consumption and rehabilitative investment (with sss s= ) for a partially 
environmentally concerned society. (See the Appendix for proof.) 
 
   PROPOSITION 2 (Convergence): From any initial point there is a convergence to the 
interior steady state of a partially environmentally concerned society along a clockwise 
spiral of consumption and investment in the environment. (See the Appendix for proof.) 
 
 
Figure 1. Damped oscillations of consumption and rehabilitative investment 
s 0s =  
0c =  
s
 
sss s=
 
0 c 
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   PROPOSITION 3 (Stationary production): The optimal stationary output of a partially 
environmentally concerned society is larger than that of an environmentally unconcerned 
society with identical rates of time preference, regeneration and capital depreciation and 
identical production process. 
 
The underlying rationale for proposition 3 is as follows. In steady state, the value of the 
marginal product of capital is equal to the user cost of capital for a partially 
environmentally concerned society as well as for an environmentally unconcerned 
society. While both have the same user cost of capital ( )nρ δ+ +  and the same 
production process ( f ), they have different assessments of the full price of their identical 
products. For the environmentally unconcerned society, the full price of the product is 
equal to a market price (a numéraire), which does not internalize the environmental 
damage. For a partially environmentally concerned society, the full price of the product 
also includes the ratio of the pollution generated by its production (w) to the 
environmental improvement ( ( )ss ssg s E′ ) that can be generated by its investment in 
rehabilitating the environment. Due to its higher assessment of the product’s full price, 
ceteris paribus, the stationary capital stock and production of the partially 
environmentally concerned society are larger than that of an environmentally 
unconcerned society.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Partial environmental concern, manifested in this paper by 0 1β< <  and positive shadow 
value of the quality of the environment ( 2 0λ > ), directly affects utility by spoiling 
satisfaction from consumption and also indirectly by diverting resources from 
consumption and investment in production capacity to investment in rehabilitating the 
environment. As displayed by the phase-plane diagram, the joint transition of 
consumption and investment in the environment for a society of partially environmentally 
concerned lifetime-utility maximizers is along a clockwise converging spiral where a 
period of rising consumption and rehabilitative investment is followed by a period of 
rising consumption and decreasing rehabilitative investment, a period of decreasing 
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consumption and rehabilitative investment, a period of decreasing consumption and 
rising rehabilitative investment, and so on. However, the existence of an interior steady 
state depends on the society’s rate of time preference being larger than a critical level, 
[ (1 ) ( ) / ( )ss sswf k E g sβ β− + ], which can be interpreted as the society’s lack of full 
concern (1 β− ) about the proportion of the environment damage ( ( ) /ss swf k E s ) 
engendered by its production plus the instantaneous rate of improvement of the 
environment ( ( )g s ) weighted by the society’s degree of environmental concern ( β ). 
Due to its higher evaluation of its product’s full price, ceteris paribus, the stationary 
production of the partially environmentally concerned society is larger than that of an 
environmentally unconcerned, but otherwise identical, society. Despite its larger 
production, the stationary environment of the partially concerned society is better than 
that of an environmentally unconcerned society due to investing in rehabilitation. 
   The analysis has focused on the utility aspects of environmental concern. Extensions of 
the model may include possible adverse effects of environmental degradation on 
production inputs and, in turn, on production. In particular, labor health and, 
consequently, labor productivity can be adversely affected by pollution, and land 
productivity can be reduced by acid rain, dust storm, floods, fire, winds and extreme 
temperatures.   
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APPENDIX  
Derivation of the golden rules (9) and (10) 
By differentiating the optimality condition (6) with respect to t  the following singular 
control equation is obtained: 
0)()()(' 1
1 =−′′+′− −−−− λρβ βρβρβρ ccuEecuEeEcuEe ttt     (A1) 
and in recalling equations (4) and (7): 
0)()('})(/1{
)()()('
11
1
=+−′++
′′+′− −−−−
λδλ
ρβ βρβρβρ
nkfEsgw
ccuEecuEeEcuEe ttt
     (A2) 
Recalling (6): 
0)}()('])(/1){[('
)()()('1
=+−′++
′′+′−
−
−−−−
nkfEsgwcuEe
ccuEecuEeEcuEe
t
ttt
δ
ρβ
βρ
βρβρβρ
     (A3) 
Dividing by : )(cuEe t ′− βρ
0)('])(/1[)](/)([)(1 =′++′′′+++−− kfEsgwccucunEE δρβ .   (A4) 
Hence, 
)(/)(
/)()('])(/1[
cucu
EEnkfEsgwc
′′′−
+++−′+
=
βδρ .     (A5) 
By differentiating the optimality condition (7) with respect to the following singular 
control equation is obtained: 
t
0)()()( 2221 =′′+′+′+− ssgEEsgEsg λλλλ  .     (A6) 
Recalling (4) and (5): 
0)()()()](/)([
/)()(')/(
2
1
2121
=′′+′+′+−
+−+
−− ssgEEsgEsgsgcuEe
nkfw
t λβ
λλδλλ
βρ    (A7) 
By (7) and (6): 
EsgcuEe t )(/)('2 ′=
− βρλ         (A8) 
and  
Esg )(/ 21 ′=λλ .         (A9) 
Hence, 
0)()()()}()('/)()({
)()()('])([
=′′+′+′+′−
′+−+′
ssgEEsgEsgsgcucusg
EsgnkfwEsg
β
δ
    (A10) 
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Dividing both sides by : Esg )(′
0)()(/)}()('/)()({
)()('])(/1[
=′′′+++′−
+−′+
ssgsgEEsgcucusg
nkfEsgw
β
δ
     (A11) 
Hence, 
)()(
/)()('/)()()()('])(/1[
sgsg
EEsgcucusgnkfEsgws
′′′−
+−′−+−′+
=
βδ .   (A12) 
From (2), 
EkwfsgEE /)()(/ −=         (A13) 
and hence: 
)(/)(
]/)()([)()('])(/1[
cucu
EkwfsgnkfEsgwc
′′′−
−+++−′+
=
βδρ    (A14) 
)()(
/)()('/)()()()('])(/1[
sgsg
EkwfcucusgnkfEsgws
′′′−
−′−+−′+
=
βδ .   (A15) 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
From (9), the isocline  is given by: 0c =
[1 / ( ) ] '( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( ) / ] 0w g s E f k n g s wf k Eρ δ β′+ − + + + − = .    (A16) 
This isocline is represented by a horizontal line in the c-s plane. 
From (10), the isocline  is given by: 0=s
[1 / ( ) ] '( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) / '( ) ( ) / 0w g s E f k n g s u c u c wf k Eδ β′ ′+ − + − − =
=
.   (A17) 
By total differentiation: 
2[ ( ) / ( ) ( ) / ( )] ( ) ( )[1 ( ) ( ) / ( )] 0wf k g s E u c u c g s ds g s u c u c u c dcβ β′ ′ ′ ′′ ′ ′′ ′− + − −  (A18) 
and hence: 
20
( )[1 ( ) ( ) / ( )] 0.
[ ( ) / ( ) ( ) / ( )] ( )s
ds g s u c u c u c
dc wf k g s E u c u c g s
β
β=
′ ′′ ′−
= − >
′ ′ ′ ′′+
    (A19) 
Recalling that  for ( ) / ( ) 0u c u c′ = 0c =  and (A17), the intercept (0, )s  of the 
isocline  should satisfy:   0=s
[1 / ( ) ] '( ) ( ) ( ) / 0w g s E f k n wf k Eδ′+ − + − =      (A20) 
which implies:  
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'( ) /( ) .
( ) ( ) / '( )
wf k Eg s
n wf k E f kδ
′ =
+ + −
       (A21) 
From (A16), the intercept (0, )s of the isocline 0c =  should satisfy:  
[1 / ( ) ] '( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( ) / ] 0w g s E f k n g s wf k Eρ δ β′+ − + + + − =     (A22) 
which implies: 
'( ) /( ) .
( ) ( ) / ( ) '( )
wf k Eg s
n wf k E g s f kρ δ β β
′ =
+ + + − −
     (A23) 
Recalling the assumptions that ( ) 0f k′ >  and ( ) 0g s′ > , the denominators on the right-
hand sides of (A21) and (A23) are positive. Recalling further that , ( ) 0g s′′ < s s<  for 
any given combination of k and E, consequently for the relevant one ( , )ss ssk E , if: 
( ) ( ) / '( ) ( ) ( ) / ( ) '( )ss ss ss ss ss ssn wf k E f k n wf k E g s f kδ ρ δ β β+ + − < + + + − −  (A24) 
or, equivalently, if:  
(1 ) ( ) / ( )ss sswf k E g sρ β> − + β .       (A25) 
Recalling that the isocline  is horizontal whereas the isocline  is upward 
sloped, if the inequality (A25) holds, the intercept of the isocline 
0c = 0=s
0=s  is smaller than 
that of the isocline  and hence these isoclines intersect one another and do so only 
once. Their intersection defines a unique, interior steady state with 
0c =
sss s= .  
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
By differentiating (9): 
2( ) ( ) / ( ) ( ) 0
( ) / ( )
dc wf k g s g s E g s
ds u c u c
β′ ′′ ′ ′− +
=
′′ ′−
>       (A26) 
which explains the direction of the horizontal arrows in the four phases in Figure 1. 
By differentiating (10): 
( )[1 ( ) ( ) / ( )] 0
( ) ( )
ds g s u c u c u c
dc g s g s
β ′ ′′ ′− −
=
′′ ′−
<        (A27) 
which explains the direction of the vertical arrows in the four phases displayed in Figure 
1. The combinations of the horizontal and vertical arrows reveal that the steady state is 
either a spiral point or a centre. The particular nature of the steady state can be found by 
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computing the trace of the Jacobian (state-transition) matrix of the linearized (9) and (10) 
equation system at the steady state. The elements on the main diagonal of this matrix are: 
2
11 2
( ) ( ) '( )( ) {1 / ( )] ( ) ( )}
[ ( )]
ss ss
ss ss
ss
u c u c u cdAJ ss w g s f k n
dc u c
ρ δ
′′ ′′′− +′ ′= = + − + +
′′−
ss  (A28) 
2
22 2
( ) ( ) ( ){1 / ( )] ( ) ( )}
[ ( )]
ss ss
ss ss
ss
g s g s g sdBJ w g s f k n
ds g s
δ
′′ ′′′ ′− +′ ′= = + − +
′′−
ss .  (A29) 
Recalling (A5), 
0)()()}(/1[ =++−′′+ nkfsgw ssss δρ        (A30) 
and hence .  011 =J
From (A30), 
0)()()}(/1[ >=+−′′+ ρδ nkfsgw ssss        (A31) 
which implies that ρ−=22J  as long as 0=′′′g . Since trJ ρ= −  and 0ρ >  for an agent 
with a time preference, the joint trajectory of c and s is a converging spiral. The interior 
steady state is asymptotically stable and approachable along a clockwise spiral displaying 
oscillations of consumption and investment in the environment.  
 
Proof of Proposition 3  
In view of equation (2):  
( ) ( ) / 0ss ss ssg s wf k E− =          (A32) 
which in conjunction with equation (9) implies that the value of the stationary marginal 
product of capital is equal to the user cost of capital: 
 [1 /( ( ) )] '( ) ( )ss ss ssw g s E f k nρ δ′+ = + + .       (A33) 
Consequently, the stationary marginal product of the partially environmentally concerned 
representative agent is given by:  
'( ) {( ) /[1 / ( ) ]}ssf k n w g s Ess ssρ δ ′= + + + .       (A34) 
Since 1 , / ( ) 1ss ssw g s E′+ > '( ) ( )ssf k nρ δ< + + .  
In the case of environmentally unconcerned agents, 0β =  and also 2 0λ =  (i.e., the 
shadow value of the environment is negligible). Consequently, the stationary marginal 
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product of a lifetime utility maximizing environmentally unconcerned representative 
agent is given (as in the prototype Ramsey model) by: 
 '( ) ( )ssf k ρ δ= + + n
n
.         (A35) 
Since , 1 / ( ) 1ss ssw g s E′+ > {( ) /[1 / ( ) ]} ( )ss ssn w g s Eρ δ ρ δ′+ + + < + + . Therefore, 
'( ) ( )ss ssf k f k′< . Recalling that 0f ′′ < , ss sk k> s  and hence ( ) ( )ss ssf k f k′> . 
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